  
      
      
      Sud Aviation and 
      Aérospatiale
      In France, 
      the relationship between the government and the aerospace industry is very 
      different from that in the United States. American firms compete to win 
      contracts from the Department of Defence in Washington, relying on income 
      from those contracts to stay in business. Yet even the largest such 
      corporations remain in the hands of private individuals, including their 
      stockholders. 
      By contrast, 
      in France, the government owns the industry outright. In particular, the 
      government owns 97 percent of that country's largest aerospace company, 
      the firm of Aérospatiale. Officials in Paris thus have been free to use 
      this industry as an arm of the state, to advance French interests. Yet 
      experience has shown that, despite having the power of the state on their 
      side, aerospace leaders have found that there is no substitute for 
      responding to the demands of the market. 
      The story of 
      Aérospatiale begins around 1950 with its corporate predecessor, SNCASE. 
      The company was building a line of aircraft that were rather unexciting 
      but brought steady business. These included the Languedoc airliner and two 
      fighters, the Vampire and Mistral. The Vampire was British, being built 
      under license; the Mistral used a jet engine, the Nene, from Britain's 
      firm of Rolls-Royce. In sum, there was not an enormous amount of original 
      thinking at SNCASE. 
      This changed 
      in 1951 though, as the company began to build the Caravelle jetliner. The 
      Caravelle was not the world's first jetliner, but it was the first to fly 
      successfully. It had two engines and was built to serve short routes, 
      which were quite numerous in Europe. Significantly, its design placed 
      those engines at the rear of the airplane, behind the passenger cabin, 
      rather than under the wings, which led to a noisier ride. Passengers could 
      barely hear the engines, and the Caravelle became very attractive because 
      it was very quiet. Its jet engines also gave a smooth and comfortable ride 
      that was free of harsh vibrations. 
      Air France, 
      the national airline, placed the first orders. That was to be expected; it 
      too was an arm of the state. However, nearly every other major European 
      airline also bought them. In a major breakthrough for France, America's 
      United Airlines purchased 20 Caravelles. This broke with the practice of 
      America's carriers, which together formed the largest market for airliners 
      in the world, buying only American-built aircraft. 
      The first 
      Caravelles entered service in May 1959. Two years later, they flew an 
      array of European routes running from London to Casablanca in North 
      Africa, while extending eastward to Moscow and to Tel Aviv and Damascus in 
      the Middle East. In the United States, Caravelles were serving the 
      important route from New York to Chicago. By then SNCASE had merged with 
      another French planebuilder, Ouest Aviation, and had formed the powerful 
      new firm of Sud Aviation. Having achieved great success with Caravelle, 
      Sud now was ready for something new. 
      This took 
      shape as the Concorde, a joint French-British attempt to build a 
      supersonic commercial airliner. However, it ran into cost overruns and 
      delays, largely because it was a political project. Four companies built 
      it: British Aircraft and Sud, along with Bristol Siddeley and the French 
      engine-building firm of SNECMA. However, all four were working as 
      subcontractors to their governments, which meant that political leaders 
      made the most important decisions. In particular, those leaders wanted the 
      Concorde program to provide jobs for workers, so they set up two separate 
      assembly lines, one in Britain and the other in France. Production 
      facilities are among the most costly parts of a major aircraft program, 
      and this decision brought a great deal of wasteful duplication. 
      In addition, 
      the delays that ensued provided time for the Boeing 747 to emerge as a 
      rival. This enormous jetliner was far slower than the Concorde but was 
      very comfortable, and travelers liked its low fares. By contrast, the 
      Concorde came along just in time for the oil crises of the 1970s, which 
      sent the cost of jet fuel sky-high. The high-speed flight of Concorde was 
      achieved by burning as much fuel as the vastly larger 747 used, yet 
      Concorde carried only one-fourth as many passengers. Each of them then had 
      to pay four times as much as a 747 passenger did. 
      Only two 
      airlines ever purchased Concorde, and only in very small numbers. These 
      were the national carriers Air France and British Airways. The Concorde, 
      born in state decisions, ended the same way, as only the airlines of those 
      governments cared to buy them. 
      Sud Aviation 
      continued to expand, merging in 1970 with another rival, Nord Aviation, 
      and with the missile and space group called SEREB. Together they formed 
      Aérospatiale. By then, company officials had learned sharp lessons from 
      the Concorde. They vowed that on their next attempt, they would build 
      something that airlines actually would buy. 
      This next 
      effort took shape within an international collaboration called Airbus 
      Industrie, which brought in British Aerospace as a partner, along with a 
      subsidiary of Germany's firm of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm. They proceeded 
      to build the two-engine Airbus A-300 jetliner. It had the wide cabin of 
      Boeing's 747, which was popular for its spaciousness. 
      At first, the 
      A-300 looked like another flop. Few of them sold, while the French 
      government continued to build these aircraft to provide jobs. Aérospatiale 
      could not simply cut back production and lay off its workers, for French 
      law required that such unemployed people were to receive 90 percent of 
      their pay for a year, while retaining their extensive health benefits. As 
      a result, Airbus Industrie was building planes that no one wanted. 
      Yet while the 
      high price of fuel helped to kill Concorde, it saved Airbus, because the 
      A-300 burned less fuel. It had rivals in triple-engine wide-body 
      airliners—the Lockheed L-1011 and the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. But the 
      A-300 had one less engine and hence was lighter in weight, which is why it 
      used less fuel.  
      The A-300 had 
      other advantages. Having only two engines, it was less costly to purchase. 
      The tri-jets had mounted an engine in the tail, but the A-300 avoided 
      this. Hence it could fit more fare-paying passengers into its cabin. The 
      A-300 soon drove the DC-10 and L-1011 from the market. This success opened 
      new doors for Airbus, which launched new projects and went on to challenge 
      Boeing for leadership in aviation. 
      Aérospatiale 
      also showed leadership in space flight. A European effort of the 1960s 
      sought to build the Europa launch vehicle, a three-stage rocket with 
      separate stages built in Britain, France, and Germany. All flight tests 
      failed, partly because there was no central authority that could tell 
      these sovereign governments what to do. Then in 1973, officials of 
      Aérospatiale stepped in. 
      They proposed 
      to build a new launch vehicle called the Ariane. Other European nations 
      also were welcome to participate—but officials in France would make the 
      most important decisions, which would be binding on all. This approach 
      worked, with Ariane succeeding brilliantly on its very first flight late 
      in 1979. With this, the French went on to gain a strong advantage over the 
      United States. American space leaders had placed their hopes on the Space 
      Shuttle. But the explosion in flight of the Shuttle Challenger in 
      1986 showed that this launch vehicle was too complex for routine use and 
      could only fly in limited service. Aérospatiale went on to develop more 
      capable versions of the Ariane, which took much of the business of space 
      launches away from the Americans. 
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